Lawrence Feingold on Freedom of the Will
Apr 15th, 2011 | By Bryan Cross | Category: Blog PostsTwo days ago, Professor Lawrence Feingold of Ave Maria University’s Institute for Pastoral Theology and author of The Natural Desire to See God According to St. Thomas and his Interpreters gave a lecture titled “The Freedom of the Will” to the Association of Hebrew Catholics. The audio recordings of the lecture and of the following Q&A are available below. Some parts of the lecture and certain questions in the Q&A are highly relevant to points of disagreement between Protestants and the Catholic Church. Below I have provided a brief outline of the lecture (including in parentheses the minute number in the audio recording), and the subsequent Q&A.
Lawrence Feingold
Lecture:
[podcast]https://www.hebrewcatholic.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/S8L09FreedomoftheWill.mp3[/podcast]
I. Freedom is in the will, on account of our intellect; we cannot love what we do not know.
A. Our will is open to all goodness. (2′)
B. Natural desire (3′) — some things we naturally desire, and not by free choice. We’re free to choose the means to those ends.
II. Three different senses of the term ‘freedom.’ (5′)
(A.) Natural freedom (freedom between),
(B.) Circumstantial freedom (freedom from coercion), and
(C.) Acquired freedom (freedom for the good, virtuous freedom).
‘Free will’ refers to natural freedom (between goods, to act or not to act). The most important kind of freedom is freedom for, but to acquire it, we need natural freedom.1 [The distinction between natural freedom and acquired freedom is the same distinction Servais Pinckaers refers to in his Sources of Christian Ethics (CUA Press; 3rd ed. 1995) as the distinction between freedom of indifference and freedom for excellence, respectively.]
III. Both human experience and divine revelation show us that we have natural freedom. (9′)
Q1. If God is the total good, then how can we be free to reject God, if we are not free with regard to the total good? (15′)
Q2. If one alternative is better than another, are we still free to choose between them? (16′)
IV. The denials of free will (17′)
A. Gnostics / Manichees (18′)2
B. Protestantism: Luther and Calvin (19′ – 31′)
Response by the Council of Trent (31′)
C. The heresy of Jansenism (33′)
D. Materialism/determinism (35′)
E. Freudianism (35′)
V. John Paul II “Reconciliation and Penance” (36′)
A. Free will and self-determination: By building up our identity through our free choices, we become our own fathers and mothers (Gregory of Nyssa) (38′)
B. Free will and Day of Judgment (39′)
VI. Pope Leo XIII “Libertas Praestantissimum” (39′)
A. The distinction between “natural freedom” (freedom between), and moral freedom (freedom for the good).
B. Freedom and the ability to sin. The ability to sin accompanies the kind of liberty we have on earth, not of the essence of freedom. (41′) The ability to sin belongs to us during the state of trial. (42′)
C. The freedom of God and the blessed in heaven. (42′)
VII. Whoever commits sin is a slave of sin. (44′)
VIII. The truth shall set you free. (47′)
Q. In what sense does the person in a state of grace have freedom, and in what sense does the person in a state of mortal sin have freedom? (50′)
IX. John Paul II’s 1985 “Letter to the Youth of the World” (Dilecti Amici) (51′) —
A. What does it mean to be truly free?
B. What is the relation between freedom and the divine law? (52′) Contemporary confusion regarding the relation of law and freedom (54′). Jewish conception of Torah.
X. Freedom between and Freedom for
A. Liberation theology (55′)
B. Freedom and the new atheism (57′)
C. Sartre and unlimited freedom (58′)
D. Freedom for is for self-giving to God and neighbor (61′)
E. St. Ignatius of Loyola on freedom (62′)
Q&A:
[podcast]https://www.hebrewcatholic.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/S8L09FreedomoftheWillQ.mp3[/podcast]
(1) Does prayer affect God’s freedom? If not, how can it be efficacious? What can it change? (1′)
(2) When a tragedy happens, such as 9/11, we may say it was God’s will. And yet sin is a turning away from God’s will. And that act of terrorism (i.e. 9/11) was a sin, and thus a turning away from God’s will? So how do we reconcile these two claims? (5′)
(3) Is the law contrary to the lower freedom (freedom from coercion)? (11′)
(4) If God gives efficacious grace only to some, how is that compatible with Christ dying for all, and with His universal salvific will? (12′)
(5) If man is free to cooperate with grace or resist grace, how is that not Pelagianism, and how does that not make man his own savior, and rob God of all the glory? (18′)
(6) How is predestination compatible with freedom? (22′)
(7) Isn’t one of the problems determinists have with freedom how they can conceive of time, since they operate with a clock-sense of time? (26′)
(8) If people don’t believe in the authority of the Church are they effectively outside the Church, or is it that they just don’t have direction, or are they in “freedom from”? (28′)
(9) Is the definition of ‘good’ love? (31′)
(10) If you wanted to enlighten your friend concerning the errors of Luther, what would you say in less than 50 words? (32′)
Download the mp3s here.
- Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Disputed Questions on Evil, Question VI, “On Human Choice.” [↩]
- See, for example, Orthodoxus’s last reply to Valentinus in St. Methodius of Olympus’s “Concerning Free Will. [↩]
If you’re short on time, listen from 19′ through 31′ of the lecture, and 12′ through 26′ of the Q&A (i.e. questions 4, 5, and 6).
Thanks Bryan!
Professor Feingold’s lectures as well as this website was one of the leading factors in re-invigorating my nominally Catholic upbringing to a stronger belief in the Church and in her teachings.
God bless,
-Steven Reyes
Awesome! Thanks Dr. Feingold!
“Freedom is in the will, on account of our intellect; we cannot love what we do not know.”
As expressed, this doesn’t make much sense. If freedom is something that pertains to the will, it does so from the nature of the will, not from some other power. At best, I think all you can derive from this statement is that the intellect is a sine qua non cause for volitional activity. but that has nothing to do with freedom.
Lee,
That sine qua non is just what is meant here.
In the peace of Christ,
– Bryan
Thanks for the clarification.
Perhaps I missed it (and if so please direct me to the relevant portion), but I did not see much interaction with the idea of God’s decree. Dr. Feingold mentioned the idea of foreknowledge and I think he ably demonstrated that it in no way limits freedom. I put forward the following questions though,
Does God decree whatsoever comes to pass?
If so, what is the relationship between God’s decree and his foreknowledge?
If so, how does Dr. Feingold’s analogy of the arrow speak to the decree and not to foreknowledge. More clearly, can God’s decree be thwarted or his foreknowledge incorrect if man’s free will allows him to always resist grace?
This is perhaps a Protestant misunderstanding, but how do operating and cooperating graces work given Dr. Feingold’s scheme?
Thanks in advance for what I’m sure will be thoughtful responses.
I’m going to give this a shameless bump because I really do want to see thoughts on these issues.
RefProt (re: #7)
Nothing occurs outside God’s consequent will, but His consequent will takes into account our free choices. (On the distinction between antecedent will and consequent will, see here.) He wills that we have natural freedom, and so He governs all things while preserving the integrity and secondary causality of the things He has made, include the freedom of the rational creatures He has made. We’re not puppets driven by forces beyond us toward an inevitable fate about which we have no true choice.
God’s consequent will cannot be thwarted. But His consequent will has already taken into account our free choices. His foreknowledge cannot be incorrect, but that in no way removes freedom (“freedom between”) from the rational creature, just as knowing what someone has already chosen does not impose necessity on his choice.
I recommend listening to minutes 25′ through 62′ of the *second* lecture (i.e. the one on actual grace) at “Lawrence Feingold on Sanctifying Grace and Actual Grace.”
In the peace of Christ,
– Bryan
In the fourth century, St. Cyril of Jerusalem wrote the following on free will:
D.B. Hart writes:
Hart’s argument treats what in the lecture above is referred to as “acquired freedom” (or freedom for excellence) as though it eliminates or rules out “natural freedom.” But acquired freedom does not eliminate the possibility of natural freedom.
(Reposting this here on the proper thread).
I have written here before (a good while ago). I am in the Reformed/Evangelical tradition, and have interacted a fair amount with Catholic thinking and teaching, including Thomistic thought, all to a limited agree. Of course I am more on the âbondage of the willâ side of things. However, with that said, I am wondering about a deeper definition of the Catholic term âfree willâ, as it is used in Aquinas, Catholic teachings, et al. On the New Advent site, I read that it is the ârational appetiteâ. I am trying to get a better, somewhat deeper and more expansive understanding of the Catholic usage. To be sure, I do see the will as being biased towards its prevailing nature (sin for the unbeliever, good for the believer). However, still trying to make sure I get the Catholic definition correct. Thank you for anything
Matt (re: #12)
The Catholic Encyclopedia article on the will would be a good place to start.
In the peace of Christ,
– Bryan
Thank you. Will consult this, freely. :-)
The theologian David Bentley Hart, whom I referred to in comment #11 above, has recently argued for universalism. He said:
Notice that his argument takes the form of a conditional: if the memories and knowledge the saints have of the damned and their on-going suffering are removed or lost or converted into indifference or greater beatitude, then either (a) the saints cannot attain bliss or (b) whatever attains bliss is not a person. Of course this argument begs the question. It presupposes precisely what is in question, because it presupposes that God Himself (whose happiness the saints come to share in heaven) cannot be happy if any persons are damned. And this presupposes a process conception of God, namely, that He can lose His perfect happiness, and that His happiness is not intrinsic to Him and essential to Him, but contingent. And this implies that either the one we are referring to as ‘God’ is not God, or that there is no God (see comment #57 in the “Doug Wilson Weighs In” thread).
However, I do not wish to discuss universalism in this thread. (I’ve addressed it at the link in comment #4 in the “God’s Universal Salvific Will” thread.) Rather, I want to address Hart’s objection to free will in his argument for universalism. I’ll do so by going through his two paragraphs claim by claim. Hart says:
Notice that so far he has given no reason or argument against libertarian free will (i.e. natural freedom); he has only used defaming terms such as “moral hideousness,” “poorer,” and “crudely.”
He continues:
Here Hart presents a dilemma which he claims entails the failure of all appeals to [libertarian] free will as a justification for hell. According to Hart, either the will is not determined by the good, in which case the will is indistinguishable from “sheer chance or mindless organic or mechanical impulse” or the will is determined by the good, in which case the will is not free [in the libertarian sense]. We discussed this already in comments #301 – #331 of this thread, but the dilemma Hart puts forward presupposes precisely what is in question between the critic (e.g. Hart) and the person who holds that there is such a thing as natural liberty (i.e. libertarian free will). Hart’s dilemma presupposes that there is not a third position in which free agents directed to the good are (in that particular epistemic condition) neither determined by the good nor reducible to the ontological equivalent of “sheer chance” or “mindless organic or mechanical impulse.” In this way Hart’s argument simply begs the question, i.e. presupposes precisely what is in dispute between himself and those who disagree with him. Libertarian free will allows for the great gift of the dignity of self-determination (i.e. participation in our own formation), which explains the existence of the probationary period, rather than being created already in the Beatific Vision. (See “The Gospel and the Meaning of Life.”)
He continues:
Here again Hart begs the question by using an analogy which, for the defender of free will, is disanalogous. The person who freely chooses sin is precisely not morally and epistemically equivalent to the “deranged child” who thrusts her face into the fire. The deranged child is not morally responsible for her actions, because she does not know what she is doing. But the sinner is responsible for his actions, and knows the good he should do but freely chooses not to do it. So Hart’s analogy presupposes precisely what is in question.
Finally, he says:
The proper evaluation of arguments has to do with their soundness, not whether they are “insufferable.” See my “Guide to Rational Ecumenical Dialogue.” The ignorance and mortality with which we come into the world, as well as the defectibility of our intellect and will, and the suffering of even the most innocent and delightful of creatures, is fully compatible with our having libertarian free will.
Actually Hart’s argument is unanswerable correct on this point. All Christian tradition, knowing God to be both the source of being and the substance of the transcendental a, understands freedom as inseparable from true knowledge. The Tryth shall set you free. And he is not obliged to repeat the whole critique of libertarian models that have been so well advanced by Puntel, MacInttre, Murdoch, and so on. More interesting, though, he could omit all that from his case and his argument still holds.
A process conception of God? Are you kidding? That’s so far off the mark that it’s clear you didn’t listen to the argument at all. What’s worse, the “moral hideousness” remark wasn’t aimed at the free will defense at all, but at the notion of the saints delighting in the torments of the damned. You misquote him intentionally. Yet worse, you pretend he did not adequately explain why he rejects the pure libertarian model of the will when he most definitely did.
Sheesh (as they say).
Kyle (re: #16),
Yes, we (Christians) have acknowledged that the truth shall set us free. But that does not mean that we have conflated natural freedom and acquired freedom, as I explained in comment #11 above, and as explained in the lecture in the body of the post at the top of this page. The existence of acquired freedom does not ipso facto rule out the possibility (or actuality) of natural freedom. Just because one acknowledges and embraces the notion of acquired freedom, it does not follow that one must give up the notion of natural freedom.
I agree that he is not obliged to repeat anything. But his not being obliged to do that does not falsify anything I said in #15 above.
Again, that does not show anything I said in #15 to be false.
In the peace of Christ,
– Bryan
Kathy (re: #17)
Set aside the personal attack and address my argument. (We don’t allow personal attacks here.) What you’ll need to do is show how the process position does not follow from affirming the notion that God (in His divine nature) can lose His happiness. If, however, God cannot lose His happiness, even when persons reject Him definitively, then it is possible to be perfectly good and truly and supremely happy even under such conditions. In that case, since the saints share in God’s happiness, it is possible for the saints too to be supremely happy under such conditions.
I did not claim that his “moral hideousness” remark was aimed at the free will defense.
Now you presume to be a mind-reader. I have not misquoted anyone intentionally.
I have not pretended anything. I simply showed (in comment #15) four things. First, I showed that his argument for universalism begs the question. Second, I showed that his dilemma against libertarian free will begs the question because, from the perspective of the libertarian paradigm, it is a false dilemma. Third, I showed that his analogy begs the question, by presupposing what remains to be shown. And fourth, I pointed out that the personal conditions to which he appeals are fully compatible with our having libertarian free will. If you think anything I wrote there was mistaken, please show how and where.
In the peace of Christ,
– Bryan
Not that it really sheds much light, but i will still add my comments.
The whole question of how GOD can be eternally happy when there are those who are eternally damned is interesting. At the end of the day, no matter how tightly we slice the logic and verbage, I think we wind up having to say it is….. a mystery. Which I think orthodoxy always is. I think Chesterton advanced that idea. It is of course an outgrowth and consequence of the free will/sovereignty issue which is similarly resolved.
Jeremiah (re: #20)
This is something accessible to natural human reason, and therefore need not be treated as a mystery. (cf. ST I Q.26) God’s beatitude is grounded in Himself. He is His own beatitude, and His beatitude is uncreated. But only God is uncreated. For this reason, His beatitude is not contingent on what is created. Nor is it variable, or dependent on what free creatures do. No creature can rob God of any happiness or add anything to God’s happiness. Creatures (e.g. Satan) can deprive themselves of participation in God’s beatitude, or they can participate in God’s beatitude, as do the angels and saints.
In the peace of Christ,
– Bryan